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Military spending is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the resources it 
takes up, especially when it leads to or facilitates conflicts. This chapter provides an overview 
of the issues involved in analysing the effects of military spending on growth. It considers the 
alternative general economic theories that inform the development of models to undertake 
empirical  analyses,  and  estimation  issues  in  undertaking  those  analyses.  The  Feder-Ram 
model, the modified Solow and the endogenous growth models, are discussed in detail, before 
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1. Introduction 
 
Assessing the importance of military spending to the economy remains an important task, 
especially given the growth in military spending in recent years and the recent financial crisis 
and recession. According to SIPRI (2008) world military spending in 2007 was $1339 billion, 
2.5% of world GDP, an increase from 2006 of 6% in real terms. Indeed, between 1998 and 
2007 military spending increased by 45% in real terms, a trend due at least in part to the 
second Gulf War and the massive intervention of the US in Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist 
attack. As shown in Figure 1, there was a change in the trend in regional shares of military 
spending in GDP at the end of the nineties, the most marked change being the growth in 
United  States  military  burden,  with  the  declines  of  the  nineties  bottoming  out  and 
subsequently increasing for East Asia and South America. Over this period World military 
expenditure was between 2.5 and 3 percent of world GDP. 
 




Although the political justification of much of the growth of military spending is usually 
based on the need to maintain national security, these recent dynamics have led to renewed 
debate  over  whether  the  increase  of  the  military  expenditure  enhances  or  deteriorates 
economic growth and welfare. While this has been a central issue of the economic debate 
during  the  1980s  and  1990s it  was one that  did  not  achieve  a  clear  empirical  consensus 
among scholars, reflecting to a large degree the heterogeneity in the approaches used and 
differences in the sample of countries covered and the time periods covered (Dunne at al. 
2005). Early cross-country correlation analyses by Benoit (1973; 1978) quickly gave way to a 
variety  of  econometric  models,  reflecting  different  theoretical  perspectives.  Keynesian, 
neoclassical and structuralist models provided a variety of specifications for different samples 
of countries. The diversity of results led to arguments for case studies of individual countries 
and relatively homogeneous groups of countries (Dunne, 1996). 
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This chapter provides an overview of the issues involved in analysing the effects of military 
spending  on  growth.  Section  two  considers  the  alternative  general  economic  theories  that 
inform the development of models to undertake empirical analyses, followed by a discussion 
of the estimation issues in section 3. Section 4 then considers the alternative formal models 
that  are  common  in  the  literature,  the  Feder  Ram  model,  the  modified  Solow  and  the 
endogenous growth models and Section 5 presents some empirical results, to illustrate the 
issue involved in estimating the models and to compare their performance. Finally, Section 6 
provides some concluding remarks  
 
 
2. General Theories of the Economic of Military Spending 
 
To interpret the results of any empirical study it is necessary to have a theory, even though this 
may not of itself be verifiable. For research on the economic effects of military spending this is 
complicated by the fact that much of economic theory does not have an explicit role for military 
spending as a distinctive economic activity. However, this has not prevented the development of 
theoretical analyses, with three basic positions being adopted in the literature on both developed 
and developing countries. The neoclassical approach sees the state as a rational actor which 
balances the opportunity costs and security benefits of military spending in order to maximise a 
well defined national interest reflected in a societal social welfare function. Military expenditure 
can then be treated as a pure public good and the economic effects of military expenditure are 
determined by its opportunity cost, with a clear trade off between civil and military spending. 
This approach readily allows consistent formal theoretical models to be developed to inform 
empirical work and has had a major influence on the literature. It can, however, be criticised for 
being ahistoric, always able to justify observed actions, concentrating on the supply side, ignoring 
the internal role of the military and military interests, implying a national consensus and requiring 
extreme knowledge and unrealistic computational abilities of the rational actors (Smith, 1977).  
 
The most influential neoclassical model was the Feder-Ram model (Biswas and Ram , 1986) but 
this has recently come under intense criticism by Dunne et al (2005). This neoclassical strand of 
the literature has been the most influential and the models are discussed in more detail in Section 
4. Other developments saw new classical economists using military expenditure as an important 
shock to the system, which can have dynamic real effects on output and more recently attempts to 
introduce military spending into endogenous growth models.  
 
An alternative Keynesian approach saw a proactive state using military spending as one aspect of 
state  spending  to  increase  output,  through  multiplier  effects  in  the  presence  of  ineffective 
aggregate demand. Military spending can then lead to increased capacity utilisation, increased 
profits and hence increased investment and growth (eg Faini et al. (1984)). It has been criticised 
for  its  failure  to  consider  supply  side  issues,  leading  many  researchers  to  include  explicit 
production  functions  in  their  Keynesian  models  (eg  Deger  and  Smith,  1983).  More  radical 
Keynesian perspectives have focused on the way in which high military spending can lead to 
industrial  inefficiencies  and  to  the  development  of  a  powerful  interest  group  composed  of 
individuals, firms and organisations who benefit from defence spending, usually referred to as the 
military  industrial  complex  (MIC).  The  MIC  increases  military  expenditure  through  internal   4
pressure within the state even when there is no threat to justify such expenditures (Dunne and 
Sköns, 2010 ). 
 
The Marxist approach sees the role of military spending in capitalist development as important 
though  contradictory.  There  are  a  number  of  strands  to  the  approach  which  differ  in  their 
treatment of crisis, the extent to which they see military expenditure as necessary to capitalist 
development,  and  the  role  of  the  MIC  in  class  struggle.  One  offshoot  of  this  approach  has 
provided the only theory in which military spending is both important in itself and an integral 
component of the theoretical analysis, the underconsumptionist approach. Developed from Baran 
and Sweezy (1966) this sees military expenditure as important in overcoming realisation crises, 
allowing the absorption of surplus without increasing wages and so maintaining profits. No other 
form  of  government  spending  can  fulfil  this  role.  While  this  approach  has  been  extremely 
influential in the general economic development literature, empirical work within this approach 
has tended to be limited to developed economies (Smith, 1977; Coulomb, 2004). 
 
Moving  beyond  a  broad  stroke  theoretical  understanding  towards  an  empirical  analysis  it 
becomes necessary to be more specific about the questions to be addressed and the way in which 
they are to be analysed. There are choices to be made many of which will be conditioned on the 
theoretical perspective adopted and the data availability. The level of level of abstraction at which 
the  empirical  analysis  should  operate  needs  to  be  determined;  the  theory  needs  to  be 
operationalised, identifying the concrete concepts to be used in the empirical analysis guided by 
the theory; the type of empirical analysis has to be decided, qualitative, quantitative, historical, 
institutional  or  some  combination  of  these;  the  time  period  has  to  be  chosen,  restricted  by 
available data and the sample of countries has to be chosen; the empirical method has to be 
chosen. If individual country case studies are undertaken they provide the opportunity for more 
detailed study, but are providing different information to cross country studies. It is also possible 
that  military  spending  may  have  a  different  effect  at  different  times,  providing  a  boost  to 
industrialisation but in the end providing a drag on further development. Results of empirical 
studies will be sensitive to the measurement and definition of the variables, to the specification of 
the estimated equations (especially the other variables included), the type of data used and the 
estimation method (Dunne, 1996). 
 
 
3. Estimation Issues 
 
In the applied work on  the economic effects of military spending a number of econometric 
approaches have been used. Firstly, single equation analyses which use economic growth as the 
dependent variable and military spending (burden, per capita or absolute value) as the, or one of 
the, independent variables, based on or informed by a structural model reflecting the approaches 
discussed in the previous section. Other studies took an alternative path and investigated the 
causal  links  (using  statistical  definitions  of  causality  referred  to  as  "Granger  causality"  to 
distinguish the concept from theoretical causality) between military expenditure and economic 
growth  without  developing  a  structural  model.  Using  dynamic  regression  or  Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) models has the advantage that they are dynamic specifications, free of 
economic assumptions imposed a priori.  Researchers, such as Kinsella (1990), Kinsella and 
Chung  (1998)  and  Dunne  and  Vougas  (1999),  Dunne  et  al  (2001),  began  to  develop  the   5
analysis to allow for long run information in the data and more recent literature has used 
Johansen’s cointegrating VAR framework. This led to a number of cross country and case 
studies, recent examples of which are Abu Bader and Abu Qarn (2003), Kollias et al (2004) 
and Tang et al (2009). Some have a structural model in mind when the start determining the 
VAR, others do not. A recent critical and comprehensive review of these studies, Dunne and 
Smith (2010), suggests that having a structural model is important in determining the direction 
of causality. Other empirical studies focus on threshold analyses (eg Reitschuler and Loening, 
2005) and non linearities 
 
Berthelemy et al (1994) used models of endogenous growth based on Romer's work to analyse 
the impact of military spending on growth for India and Pakistan This led to further endogenous 
growth models used to simulate (Sheih et al, 2007) and estimate the impact of military spending 
on growth and to consider non linearities a recent example being Pieroni (2009). These models 
have also been developed to account for the allocation of public spending and complementarities 
(d’Agostino et al, 2010). 
 
A second approach adopted simultaneous equation systems, which emphasise the importance of 
the interdependence between military spending, growth and the other variables, including Smith 
and  Smith  (1980),  Deger  and  Smith  (1983),  Deger  (1986),  Gyimah-Brempong  (1989) 
Mohammed (1992) and Scheetz (1991). The studies did vary in their use of data. Some deal with 
cross  section  averages  (eg  Deger  and  Smith,  1983),  others  with  time  series  estimates  for 
individual countries (eg Scheetz, 1991; Dunne and Nikolaidou, 2001), while others are more 
comprehensive (eg Dunne and Mohammed, 1995). Use of these models has diminished though a 
recent example is Atemoglou (2009). 
 
A third approach used macroeconometric and other forms of world models. A pioneering study 
by Leontief and Duchin (1980) used a macroeconometric model of the world economy to analyse 
the global effects of disarmament in the major powers and a transference of the resources to low 
income countries. Cappelen et al (1982) made similar analysis findings, while Gigenhack et al 
(1987)  use  the  Systems  Analysis  Research  Unit  Model  (SARUM)  and  an  arms  dynamics 
equation, of the action reaction type, to simulate the effects of different security scenarios. Other 
world models introduced forward looking expectations mechanisms eg McKibbin (1995). There 
are a number of studies using macrodels in Gleditsch et al (1996), but few individual country 
studies  for  developing  and  middle  income  countries  using  relatively  large  macromodels  for 
obvious reasons. Exceptions are Adams et al (1992) and Marwah et al, (2002), using Keynesian 
macroeconometric models and Athanassiou et al (2002) and Ozdemir and Bayar (2009) using 
CGE models. A further literature has developed on the opportunity cost of military spending, or 
the trade off between military spending and other forms of welfare expenditure (eg Ozoy, 2002). 
While this approach is somewhat problematic, as it suggests that if money was not spent on 
military spending it would be spent elsewhere and it often does not allow for the fact that it is 
possible to have more of both with economic growth (Dunne and Uye, 2009)  
 
A major problem in estimating growth models has been the lack of independent exogenous 
variation in the data. One way of overcoming this has been by pooling cross section and time 
series data for a relatively homogenous group of countries (Murdoch et al, 1997). There is a 
problem that the cross section and time series parameter may be measuring different things. 
The former could be picking up the long run effects and the latter the short run and the pooled   6
relation is then a weighted average of the two. Growth equations have been most successful in 
cross sections, because of the difficulties of distinguishing the cyclical demand side effects 
from medium term supply side growth effects. More recently the growing length of the data 
series  and  the  availability  of  reliable  cross  country  data  and  developments  in  panel  data 
estimation  methods  have led  to  a  marked  increase  in  the analysis  of  economic  growth  in 
panels (Smith and Fuertes, 2010) and its relation to military spending (Dunne et al, 2005).  
 
The available methods provide a variety of approaches to attempt to deal with some of these 
issues. The pooled OLS approach: 
(1)                  it it it y a b x u = + +    
assumes all parameters are the same for each country and invariant across time, while the 
fixed effects estimator:  
(2)  it it      x  u it i y a b = + +  
allows  the  intercept  to  differ  across  countries  which  ignores  all  information  in  the  cross 
sectional  relation.  Time  fixed  effects  can  also  be  allowed  for  separately  or  together  with 
country fixed effects in a two-way fixed effect model: 
(3)  it it        x  u jt t i y a a b = + + +  
In dynamic models of the form 
(4)  1 it           u it i it it y a b x l − = + + +  
the fixed effect estimator is not efficient, because of lagged dependent variable bias, which 
biases the OLS estimator of  λ downwards. It is, however, consistent in the limit when the 
number of time periods goes to infinity, and for samples of the size used here the bias is small. 
Thus a dynamic fixed effects specification can provide a useful starting point (Dunne et al, 
2002). Other dynamic approaches developed for large N studies difference to remove the fixed 
effects and then estimate using instrumental variables for the lagged dependent variable –often 
using GMM rather than regression methods (a recent example is Yildirim et al, 2005). If the 
parameters differ over groups there is a further heterogeneity bias, which can be dealt with by 
estimating each equation individually and taking an average of the individual estimates (Smith 




4. Modelling the Economic Effects of Military Spending 
 
For empirical analyses on the effects of military spending on growth operationalise the theory 
to form an applied model. This leads to a variety of empirical work from applied econometric 
to more focussed institutional case study analyses. When statistical analysis is undertaken, it is 
generally based on the Keynesian or neoclassical approaches, as these are most amenable to 
the creation of formal models (Dunne, 1996). One interesting feature of the debate has been 
the popularity of what was called the Feder-Ram model, despite a number of deficiencies 
identified in Dunne et al (2005).  The major alternatives have been a modified Solow growth 
model and increasingly endogenous growth models. This section reviews these models.  
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The Feder-Ram Model  
 
This supply-side model was originally developed to analyse the impact of the export sector on 
economic growth in developing economies. Using it for military spending allows the military 
sector to be treated as one sector in the economy and the externality effect of the sector and its 
differential  productivity  effect  to  be  distinguished  within  a  single-equation  model.  These 
apparent advantages have led to it having a profile within the defence economics area well 
beyond what it has achieved in other areas.  
 
The basic two-sector version of the model distinguishes between military output  (M) and 
civilian output  ( ) C , with both sectors employing homogeneous labour  (L)and capital  ( ) K , 
and military production affecting civilian production activity while θ  represent the elasticity 
of C with respect toM:    
(5)  ( , ), ( , ) ( , ) m m c c c c M M L K C C L K M c L K
θ = = = . 
with constraints: 
(6)  , , { , } i i i S i S L L K K S m c
∈ ∈ = = = ∑ ∑  
and domestic income:  
(7)  Y C M = + . 
As Dunne et al (2005) point out the summation of "butter" and "guns" in (7) is only admissible 
if  Cand  Mare understood to represent monetary output values rather than output quantities. 
Making the implicit price normalisation in (7) transparent by re-writing it in the equivalent 
form 
(8)  ( , ) ( , ) c c c m m m Y PCr L K P Mr L K = + , 
where  m P and  c P denote the (constant unitary) money prices associated with the real output 
quantities  MrandCr. The model allows the values of the marginal products of both labour 
( ) L L M , C   and capital  ( ) K K M , C   to differ across sectors by a constant uniform proportion, 
i.e. 
(9)  1 .
m L m K L K
L K c L c K
P Mr P Mr M M
C C PCr PCr
µ = = = = +  
Dependent on the price relation used in the evaluation of sectoral outputs. Differentiating (7) 
with (5) and (6) yields the growth equation  
   








  = + + +   +  
, 
where hat notation is used to indicate proportional rates of change and  I   dK  = denotes net 
investment. Using the fact that the far RHS of (1) entails a constant elasticity of  C with 
respect toM, (9) can be restated in the form 








  = + + − +   +  
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which permits - at least in principle - the separate identification of the externality effect and 
the "marginal factor productivity differential effect". As Dunne et al (2005) show the notion of 
a  marginal  factor  productivity  differential  between  sectors  in  the  model  is  a  source  of 
interpretational  pitfalls.  A  non-zero  µ  is  interpreted  one  sector  is  "less  efficient"  or  "less 
productive" in its factor use than the other due to the presence of some sort of organisational 
slack or X inefficiency and that such interpretations are not consistent with the underlying 
theoretical model.  
 
In  addition  to  these  theoretical  issues,  there  are  a  number  of  econometric  problems  in 
estimating  the  Feder  Ram  model.  In  early  studies  the  model  was  estimated  using  cross 
sectional data. In this case the main problem was multicollinearity between the final two terms 
in  the  estimating  equation  and  a  concern  with  using  possibly  insignificant  coefficients  to 
compute the externality effect. Expanded versions of the model added to this problem. When 
the model was estimated using time series data the multicollinearity problem remained and 
others were added. Firstly, there was often a lack of independent exogenous variation in the 
data, though this has been overcome to some degree by the use of the panel data methods 
discussed below.  Secondly the model is specified in growth rates which limit the dynamics to 
a single lags. Attempts to provide a more general specification increased the problems of 
multicollinearity and identification of the composite coefficients. All of these problems go 
some way to explain the variation in the results encountered in the empirical analyses and 
when combined with problems of interpretation led to a sense of dissatisfaction in a number of 
studies (Dunne et al, (2005) provide a survey. 
 
 
Neoclassical Growth Model  
 
Dunne et al (2005) argue that problems with the Feder-Ram model are serious enough to limit 
its value in empirical work  and suggest an alternative model based on a modified  Solow 
growth  model  with  Harrod-neutral  technical  progress  as  operationalised  for  cross-country 
analysis by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). The starting point for the model is the aggregate 
neoclassical production function featuring labour-augmenting technological progress 
 
(12) 
1 ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] Y t K t A t L t
α α − =  
where Y  denotes  aggregate real  income,  K  is  the  real capital  stock,  L  is  labour,  and  the 
technology parameter A evolves according to 
(13)  ( ) ( )
gt
o A t A e m t
θ = , 
where g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress and m is an index of 
military expenditure such as the share of defence spending in GDP. Taking the standard Solow 
model assumptions (constant saving rate s; constant labour force growth rate n; constant rate 
of capital depreciation d), gives the dynamics of capital accumulation:   
(14) 
( 1)ln ln




k sk g n d k se g n d
t
α α − ∂
= − + + ⇔ = − + +
∂
& , 
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where  [ ] e k : K / AL = denotes the effective capital-labour ratio and α is the constant capital-










=   + +  
. 
and linearizing (14) via a truncated Taylor series expansion around the steady state












= − + + −
∂
. 























= − + + −
∂
. 
In order to operationalize (18) for empirical work, we integrate the equation forward from t-1 
to t and get 
(19) 
* ln ( ) ln ( 1) (1 )ln , ( 1)( )
z z
e e e y t e y t e y z n g d α = − + − ≡ − + + . 
Using (13), (17) and (19),  e y  is related to observable per capita income y:= Y/L via 
(20) 
ln ( ) ln ( 1) (1 ) ln [ln ln( )]
1




y t e y t e A s n g d




  = − + − + − + +  
−  
+ − − + − −
. 
Equation (20) suggests the dynamic panel data model 
 (21)    ν µ η β γ + + + + = ∑
=
− i t t i j
j
j t i t i x y y , ,
4
1
1 , , ln ln ln  
where x1= s = gross investment/GDP, x2 = n+g+d = labour force growth rate + 0.05, x3 = m = 
military  expenditure/GDP  and  x4  =  mt-1
2.  Following  Knight  et  al  (1993;  1996)  and  Islam 
(1995) s and n are treated as varying across countries and time, while g and d are taken to be 
uniform  time-invariant  constants  and  Ao  is  country-specific  but,  by  construction,  time-
invariant.  
 
                                                            
1 Re-writing (3) in the form du/dt=f(u),u:=ln(ke), the linearized form is  [ ] f(u*)+f'(u*) u(t)-u*   
2 With  ( ) ( )
z z z
1 2 1 3 4 3 γ=e >0; β = 1-e α/ 1-α >0; β =-β <0; β =θ; β =-e θ=- γβ ; 
( ) ( ) ( )
z z
t  i o η =g t- t-1 e ;  µ = 1-e A    10
Dunne  et  al  (2005)  show  how  this  model  can  be  augmented  to  deal  with  human  capital, 
following  Mankiw,  Romer  and  Weil  (1992)  and  re-specifying  the  aggregate  production 
function as
3 
   
(22) 
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] Y t K t H t A t L t
α β α β − − = , 
Giving the equation for income per actual worker which provides the basis for the empirical 
analysis as 
(23)
ln ( ) ln ( 1) (1 ) ln ln ln ln( )]
1 1 1
ln ( ) ln ( 1) ( ( 1) )
z z y t e y t e A s s n g d
o k h
z z m t e m t t t e g
α β α β
α β α β α β
θ θ
+
= − + − + + − + +
− − − − − −




and suggesting the dynamic panel model specification 
(24)  ν µ η β γ + + + + = ∑
=
− i t t i j
j
j t i t i x y y , ,
5
1
1 , , ln ln ln  
where 1 x  s  gross investment /GDP = = ,  2 x    n g d  labour force growth rate   0.05 = + + = + , 
3 x    m  military expenditure/GDP = = , 4 t 1 x    m − = ; 5 x    human capital investment /GDP =
4. 
 
This model represents an improvement over the Feder-Ram and has been used in a number of 
recent  studies  (eg  Yakovlev,  2007)  .  It  provides  a  consistent  specification,  with  testable 
hypotheses for coefficients and when estimated is easy to interpret. 
 
While theses  exogenous  growth models provide  a  valuable  explanation  of convergence  in 
growth  between  countries,  they  came  under  criticism  for  failing  to  explain  the  observed 
growth  in  living  standards.  Endogenous  growth  models  were  developed  to  allow  for 




Endogenous Growth Model 
 
Within the literature the alternative approach that has been gaining popularity in the literature 
uses the endogenous growth models originally developed by Barro (1990). In principle this 
provides a more general framework for the analysis, but at the cost of increasing complexity 
and difficulties of interpretation. 
 
The basic model starts by assuming that a representative agent produces a single commodity 
using  a  generic  production  function  by  the  amount  of  private  capital,  k,  and  total  public 
spending, g 
                                                            
3 Temple(2001) provides some critical reflection on the plausibility of this specification. 
4 ( ) ( ) ( )
z z z
1 2 1 5 3 4 3 γ=e >0; β = 1-e α/ 1-α-β >0; β = - β +β <0; β =θ;  β = -e θ = - γβ ; 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
z z z
5 t  i o β = 1-e β/ 1-α-β >0;  η = g t- t-1 e ; µ  =  1-e A . 
   11






where  A is the exogenous rate of technology and  f  is a generic function formalized as a 
constant elasticity function (CES), Cobb-Douglas or a logarithmic function. The growth of 
private capital is modelled as: 
(26)  (1 ) k y c τ = − − &    
in which  k &  is growth rate of private capital, τ  is the flat rate of income tax and c is private 
consumption. The agent chooses the amount of private consumption to maximize the flow of 
future utility functions:  
(27)  ( ) ( ) t U c e u c ρ − =  
where ρ  is the rate of time preferences. If the utility function is specified as a CES function,  
(28) 








Sinceσ >0, the marginal elasticity is  −σ . Government expenditure G is determined by the 
amount of collected taxes of the private sector 
(29)  G y τ =  
The agent then maximizes the utility function (28) subject to a private capital accumulation 
constraint (26) and a government budget constraint (29) to choose the optimal growth rate, 
giving: 




   
         
= − −  
Which can be written as: 
(31)  1 (1 ) (1 ) g f
k
γ τ η ρ
σ
   
         
= − − −  
where η is the elasticity of γ  with respect to g (for given values of k ), so that 0 1 η < < .  
Government spending can have two effects on the growth rate. First, an increase in τ  can 
reduce γ and second an increase of  / g y can raises  / y k ∂ ∂ , which raises γ . Typically, the first 
of these dominates when government spending is large and the second when the government 
spending in GDP is small. 
  
To illustrate consider the production function of Cobb-Douglas rather than CES form. The 
elasticity of  y  with respect to  g  is constant and η α = , such as the conditions  / g y τ =  and 
/ ( / ) ( / ) g k g y g k φ =  imply that the derivative of γ  with respect to  / g y is:  









  = −  
 
 
Hence, the growth rate increases with  / g y if  / g k  is small enough such that  ' 1 φ >  and 
declines with  / g y if  / g k  is large enough such that  ' 1 φ < . In the Cobb-Douglas technology, 
the optimal size of government that maximises the growth rate corresponds to the condition   12
for productive efficiency, that is  ' 1 φ = . Since  '( / ) g y α η φ = = , it follows that  / g y α τ = = . 
This implies that their will exist an inverse hump-shaped relationship between government 
spending and the growth rate and so an optimal level of government spending.  
 




1 2 y Ak g g
α β α β − − =   0 , 1 α β < <  
where k is the private capital stock,  1 g , military government spending, and  2 g  non-military 




1 2 (1 ) k Ak g g c
α β α β τ
− − = − −  
The representative household now chooses the optimal amount of private consumption subject 
to the government spending constraint:  
(35)  1 2 G g g y τ = + =  
Taking  ϕ  and 1 ϕ −  as respectively the fraction of resources allocated to military and non-
military spending, the flows of government spending are allocated by using the following 
rules: 
(36)  1 g y ϕτ =      
(37)  2 (1 ) g y ϕ τ = −  
By solving the model, the corresponding steady-state growth rate can be written as: 
 (38)   
. ( )





α β γ α β τ φ φ ρ
+     = = − − − − −    
     
         
By rearranging (38) in terms of φ , such as  ( )
1
/ (1 ) G k A
α β
α β τ φ φ
− −
= − , and, differentiating it 
with respect to φ , we obtain: 
(39) 
1 1 1 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) j
α β
α β α β γ
φ φ αφ β φ
φ θ
− − − − − −   ∂   = − − −     ∂    
 
in which  ( )
1
1
1 (1 )(1 ) j A
α β
α β
α β α β τ τ
+
− −
− − = − − − . 
To predict the sign of the impact of the military burden on growth rate, (39) is differentiated 















< ⇒ <  
−  
 
> ⇒ >  
−  
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This  means  that  the  impact  of  military  spending  on  growth  depends  the  productivity 
parameters related to its initial share of total spending. If φ  is higher than its optimal level, the 
military burden has a negative impact on the growth rate.  
 
Barro (1990) introduces government expenditure as a public good into the production function 
which  means  the  rate  of  return  to  private  capital  increases,  which  can  stimulates  private 
investment and growth. A simplified estimable version of the model, distinguishes military 
expenditure  from  general  expenditure  and  assumes  that  it  may  indirectly  affect  economic 
growth by providing security from external threat and helping to protect property rights, which 
increases the probability that an investor will receive the marginal product of capital (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).  
 
This basic model has spurred a number of developments. Devarajan et al. (1996) developed an 
intertemporal-optimizing  endogenous  growth  model  to  examine  the  components  of 
government’s  resource  allocation  and,  as  a  specific  case,  considers  the  defence  and  non-
defence sectors. A straightforward extension of the model was carried out by d’Agostino et al. 
(2009a) in which non-military government spending was shared by public investments and 
current government consumption with the respective potential productivity. Although Stroup 
and  Heckelman  (2001)  does  not  explicitly  formalize  an  endogenous  growth  model,  they 
extend the Barro-type specification to include military spending and to evaluate a non-linear 
form  of  the  relationship,  which  is  supported  by  their  data.  The  task  of  identifying 
nonlinearities in the military spending-growth nexus, was then taken up in Aizemann  and 
Glick  (2006),  which  uses  an  endogenous  growth  model  in  which  the  effects  of  military 
spending are augmented by an interaction variable that measures the external threat. However, 
the model fails to take into account for the competitive allocation with each other public good. 
In fact, as shown by Pieroni (2009), the partial effect of military expenditure on growth can 
vary  according  to  the  different  initial  shares  of  government  expenditure  on  non-military 
categories even when a proxy of threat is included in the estimations. The results obtained 
nonparametrically  by  the  same  sample  of  Aizemann  and  Glick  (2006)  indicate  that  the 
marginal effect of a change military burden is not constant both across different levels of the 
variable and across economies and can lead, in the extreme case, to the existence of multiple 
growth regimes.  
 
Recently the literature addressed to extend the endogenous growth model by recognizing a 
prominent role for the quality of governance of a country arisen from growth literature (see, 
for example Mauro (1995) and Gupta et al. 2000). Its role is to directly affect the economic 
performance of a country and, indirectly, the allocation of military spending. d’Agostino et al. 
(2010)  consider  the  complementarities  between  military  spending  and  corruption,  with  
corruption to shifting resources to the military sector, subtracting more efficient public sectors 
(civilian investments). The relevance of the extended endogenous model is the possibility to 
include other ingredients of the cited relationship and to evaluate interaction effects of the 









To illustrate the application of the Feder-Ram and modified Solow models and the issues 
involved in a panel data context we use data are for 28 countries over the period 1960-1997 
for  GDP,  GDP  per-capita,  and  gross  domestic  fixed  capital  formation  as  a  measure  of 
investment. These are measured in constant price US dollar values at 1990 exchange rates and 
price levels (Source: World Bank). In addition, there are data on military expenditure as a 
share of GDP from SIPRI. The sample consists of two groups: 17 OECD countries (Germany, 
France, Italy, Netherland, Belgium, UK, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Portugal, USA, Canada, 
Japan, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Turkey) and 9 other countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Venezuela, South Africa, Malaysia, Phillipines, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Korea). 
 
To operationalise the Feder-Ram model for empirical application the instantaneous rates of 
change of the variables in are replaced by their discrete equivalents giving 
   
(41) ( ) 0 1 t t 1 2 t t 1 3 t t 1  t t 1
4 t t 1
  Yt / Yt 1           L / L      I / Y       M / M M / Y  
    M / M
α α α α
α
− − − −
−
∆ − = + ∆ + + ∆
+ ∆
. 
Estimating this equation for the 28 countries give the results reported in Table 1 for the one 
and two-way fixed effects and the Swamy random coefficient estimator. 
 
Table 1: Feder-Ram Model 
 
  Expect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  RCM 
    One  Two   
L /L t t 1 ∆ −   +  0.074  0.147  0.149 
    (0.8)  (1.7)  (0.3) 
I /Y t t 1 −   +  0.002  0.003  0.471 
    (1.1)  (2.2)  (2.7) 
( ) M /M   M /Y t t 1 t t 1 ∆ − −   -/+  -0.072  -0.008  11.15 
    (-0.7)  (-1.5)  -0.1 
M /M t t 1 ∆ −   -/+  0.016  0.025  -0.161 
    (1.8)  (2.9)  0.0 
t   -  -0.001    -0.0005 
    (-8.2)    (-0.8) 
         
θ Size effect    0.016  0.025  -0.161 
µ Externality    -1.112  0.017   
     
The one-way fixed effects model provides poor results for a growth equation with the labour 
and capital variables insignificant and the trend term significant but negative. The military 
spending terms are also insignificant. Moving to a two-way fixed effects model improves the 
significance  of  the  variables  and  gives  both  size  and  externality  effects  as  positive.  The 
random coefficient estimates differ with only the capital term significant and significantly 
larger in magnitude. Neither of the military expenditure terms is significant.  
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These results are rather poor as might be expected and illustrate the problems and limitations 
of  using  and  interpreting  consistently  results  from  the  Feder  Ram  model.  Despite  these  
problems  and  limitations  applications  of  the  Feder  Ram  model  provided  numerous  
contributions  to  the  guns-and-butter  debate
5.  Examples  include  Antonakis  (1997),  Sezgin 
(1996), Batchelor, Dunne and Saal (1999), Mintz and Stevenson (1995), Antonakis (1999)  
and Atesoglu and Mueller(1990). Variants have been estimated using cross-country data (e.g 
Biswas and Ram (1986)), time series data for individual countries (e.g. Huang and Mintz 
(1991), Ward et al. (1993), Sezgin (1997)), and pooled cross-section time-series data (e.g. 
Alexander (1990), Murdoch et al. (1997)).  In the past such results have led to suggestions of 
expanding the model to introduce more sectors, including Alexander (1990), Huang and Mintz 
(1991), Murdoch et al (1997), or attempting to improve the dynamics, as in Birdi and Dunne 
(2001) and Yilirim and Sezgin, 2002. However, given the criticisms in Dunne et al (2005) 
outlined above, the best response is to consider an alternative model.  
 
The modified Solow growth model developed in the previous section suggests the dynamic 
panel data specification 
(42) 
4
, , 1 , , ,
1
ln ln ln i t i t j j i t t i i t
j
y y x γ β η µ ν −
=
= + + + + ∑  
where x1= s= I/Y; x2 = n+g+d = ∆L/L; x3 = m =M/Y; x4 = mt-1 
From the development  of the theory  we have a number of expectations for the signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients: γ = e
z should be in the range 0<γ<1 and should be close to 
unity for the empirically relevant range of z = (α-1)(n+g+d)<0; β1 = (1-e
z)α/ (1- α) > 0, and 
the value for α jointly identified by γ and β1 should be within the typical range for the capital 
share in GDP of around 0.3 to 0.5; β2 = - β1 < 0; β3 = θ measures the elasticity of long-run per-
capita income with respect to the military expenditure share, and β4 = - e
z θ = - γβ3. 
 
Estimating the model gives the results in Table 2 below, for one and two-way fixed effects and 








   
                                                            
5 See Ram (1995) for a survey up to the early 1990s and  Dunne and Uye (2009) for a later one.  
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These results provide estimates that are entirely consistent with the expectations developed 
from the theory. The coefficient on lagged log output γ is positive and close to unity as we 
would expect, and the coefficient on the investment share, β1, has likewise the expected sign. 
The value for the capital-output elasticity α implied by the estimated coefficients for γ and  1 β
is  0.5  for the  fixed  effects  models  and  thus  broadly  in  line with  observable  capital share 
figures, while the implied α of 0.73 for the ECM regression is rather high. The coefficient on 
the  labour  force  growth  term,  β2,  is  both  negative  and  close  in  absolute  value  to  1 β and 
significant for the fixed effects models. The coefficient on the log of the military share  3 β is 
negative and significant for the fixed effects models, suggesting that a permanent one percent 
increase in m reduces long-run per-capita income permanently by 0.03 to 0.04 percent.(or that 
a  permanent  increase  in  m  lowers  the  steady-state  growth  path  of  per-capita  income 
permanently by 0.03 to 0.04 percent). As expected,  4 β has the opposite sign to  3 β and is of 
similar magnitude with significant estimates for the fixed effects models. The trend parameter 
ηt represents the impact of the rate of technical progress, which is assumed to be the same 
across all countries. This is significant and positive for the RCM model and while positive for 
the one way fixed effects model is not significant. 
 
Clearly both the size and the significance of the coefficients vary between the fixed and the 
random coefficient models. The existence of heterogeneity will bias γ towards one, and so we 
might expect a decrease in the coefficient with the RCM, but in fact the estimate is the same 
for all models. Certainly the results are rather encouraging, giving a sensible specification and 
seem a big improvement on the Feder Ram. Other recent studies illustrate the value of the 
model including Yakovlev(2007) and Heo(2009). 
 
  Expect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  RCM 
    One  Two   
log Yt-1   +  0.96  0.96  0.96 
    (149)  (151)  (9.1) 
 
log(I/Y)t
   +  0.04  0.04  0.11 
    (8.8)  (9.2)  (2.7) 
 
log(n+g+d)t   -/+  -0.05  -0.04  -0.14 




-/+  -0.04  -0.03  -0.06 




  0.03  0.02  0.06 
    (3.7)  (2.9)  (1.2) 
 
 trend  -  0.27  -  0.01 
    (1.5)     (2.4)   17
To illustrate the application of the Barro model a cross country panel of 53 African countries for 
the  period  2003-2007  developed  for  d’Agostino  et  al  (2010)  is  used
6.  To  provide  an 
empirically  tractable  model  from  equation  (28),  the  panel  specification  with  fixed  effects 
assumes that technological parameter A accounts for the initial level of GDP (in logs). The 
other  variables  are  the  annual  growth  rate  of  per-capita  GDP  at  constant  prices  ( ) γ and 




Table 3: Endogenous Growth Model 
 
  Fixed  effect  Dynamic  panel 
         
log GDPt-1  -15.124  **     
  (-5.926)       
γt-1      -0.058   
      (0.116)   
Milex  -0.982  **  -0.697  ** 
  (0.386)    (0.332)   
Pub investment  0.453  ***  0.607  * 
  (0.137)    (0.396)   
Gov consumption  -0.089    -0.299  * 
  (0.127)    (0.163)   
Priv investment  0.372  **  0.037  *** 
  (0.145)    (0.014)   
Constant  6.332  *     
  (-4.289)       
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5, 1 percent 
 
The first column in Table 3 reports the fixed effects estimations after that we shared non-
military spending by public investments and current government spending
7. The results are 
consistent with theoretical expectations, showing a negative impact of the military sector on 
growth. As a policy implication, a high share of military spending in GDP appears, therefore, 
responsible for lower performances of economic growth. The second column shows the results 
of  a  two-step  GMM  estimation  of  the  growth  equation  28  using  a  dynamic  panel  data 
approach (see Arellano  and Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995),  Blundell and Bond 
(1998). Adjusted standard errors of the second step by using the finite-sample correction are 
used for inference (Windmeijer, 2005). While the lagged dependent variable is not significant, 
the results are similar to the fixed effects model. There is a significant impact of military 
spending on growth rate, with the estimate suggesting an elasticity of -0.6 for the effect of 
military burden on economic growth, consistent witht eh findings of recent studies Recent 
studies include Yakovlev (2007) and  Mylonidis (2008). 
 
 
                                                            
6 The main source of our data is the "African Development Indicators" (ADI), available from the World Bank 
(WBI). 
7 The current government spending is obtained as a residual component of total government spending.  
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There is another strand of literature focused on the case studies with time series of the impact 
of military spending on growth rate, in which nonlinearities are explicitly accounted for. For 
example, Gerace (2002) testing for counter-cyclical interaction between the growth rates of 
US military expenditures and GDP found no support for the hypothesis that these expenditures 
are negatively related to the GDP growth rate. Although the importance of external events in 
the US may influence the results, Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2004; 2006) test this relationship 
arguing that the main issue is the presence of non-linearities in the data. By using a threshold 
value  for  the  military  sector,  they  estimate  the  impact  of  military  spending  on  per-capita 
growth rate above and below this value. In line with the prevalent theory, they find that for 
low  levels  of  military  spending  there  is  a  positive  effect  on  growth  rate  and,  vice-versa, 
whether the estimations are performed for higher level of military spending.  
 
The use of endogenous growth models allows us to consider the impact of technology on 
growth and provides a more general framework.  It gives flexibility in the treatment of some 
aspects of the processes at work, but at a cost. The models can quickly become complex and 
difficult to operationalise for econometric  analysis and interpret.  It is likely that modified 




Military spending is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the resources it 
takes up, especially when it leads to or facilitates conflicts. While countries need some level of 
security to deal with internal and external threats, these have opportunity costs, as they prevent 
resources being used for other purposes that might improve the pace of development. Such 
issues are clearly important for the poorest economies. With the present growth in military 
spending internationally it is important to understand the economic implications. In addition, 
there are developments that aid the researchers. Longer data series are available, helping the 
application of the rapidly developing panel data series estimation methods, and there is more 
post cold war data available, increasing the signal noise ratio. 
 
Within this increasingly data rich environment theoretical developments have also taken place. 
The Feder-Ram model which was the model of choice for a large number of past studies, has 
been  shown  to  have  a  number  of  weaknesses  and  misinterpretations  and  the  emphasis  is 
shifting to other theoretical models. While there are important heterodox approaches, the main 
developments have been the use of exogenous and endogenous growth models. As this chapter 
has seen a simple modified Solow model, where military spending has an impact on growth 
through its effects on technology, performs well and is certainly preferable to the Feder Ram 
model.  The  use  of  endogenous  growth  models  has  some  advantages  in  providing  some 
flexibility in the treatment of aspects of growth, but at the cost of complexity.  
 
The use of panel data methods for the relatively long time series available have been shown to 
be a potentially important new development for research in the area. Estimating the models 
using panel panel data, rather than simple cross-sections on averages, produced poor results 
for the Feder-Ram model, more promising results for the new growth model and illustrated the 
value of an  endogenous  growth approach. Both the exogenous growth  model study of 28   19
countries  and  the  endogenous  growth  model  study  of  Africa  suggest  a  negative  effect  of 
military spending on growth.  
 
To put these results in context, Chan’s (1985; 1987) surveys of the military spending growth 
literature, found a lack of consistency in the results, while Ram (1995) reviewed 29 studies, 
concluding little evidence of a positive effect of defence outlays on growth, but that it was also 
difficult  to  say  the  evidence  supported  a  negative  effect.  Dunne  (1996)  covering  54  studies 
concluded  that  military  spending  had  at  best  no  effect  on  growth  and  was likely  to  have  a 
negative effect, with  certainly no evidence of positive effects and Smith (2000) argued the large 
literature did not indicate any robust empirical regularity, positive or negative, but suggested 
there probably is a small negative effect in the long run, but one that requires considerably more 
sophistication to find. Dunne and Uye (2009) summarise the results of 103 studies, finding for 
developing countries that almost  39% of the cross country studies and 35% of the case studies 
find a negative effect of military spending on growth, with only around 20% finding positive for 
both  types  of  studies.  They  also add that  as  Hartley  and  Sandler  (1995)  pointed  out,  if  we 
distinguish between the supply side models and those which have a demand side, there is more 
consistency  in  the  results.  Models  allowing  for  a  demand  side  and  hence  the  possibility  of 
crowding out investment tend to find negative effects, unless there is some reallocation to other 
forms of government spending, while those with only a supply side find positive, or positive but 
insignificant, effects. Thus the fact that the supply side models find a positive effect is not a 
surprise as the model is inherently structured to find such as result (Brauer, 2002).  
 
 This does seem strong evidence against there being a positive impact of military spending on the 
economy. This suggests that cuts in military spending are unlikely to have the negative economic 
effects that are often heralded in the media. A finding that is consistent with the experience of 
most major economies in the post Cold War period, that seem to have dealt with the downturn   
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